Estimation of the cost of adopting the voluntary military service in South Korea by Lee, Jung Hyoun
  
 
 
ESTIMATION OF THE COST OF ADOPTING THE VOLUNTARY MILITARY 
SERVICE IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
 
By 
 
Lee, Jung Hyoun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS  
 
 
Submitted to  
KDI School of Public Policy and Management  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
 
2008  
  
 
ESTIMATION OF THE COST OF ADOPTING THE VOLUNTARY MILITARY 
SERVICE IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
By  
 
Lee, Jung Hyoun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS  
 
 
Submitted to  
KDI School of Public Policy and Management  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
 
 
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
2008  
Professor Yoo, Yoon Ha  
 
 
  
 
ESTIMATION OF THE COST OF ADOPTING THE VOLUNTARY MILITARY 
SERVICE IN SOUTH KOREA 
  
  
By  
 
Lee, Jung Hyoun 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS  
 
Submitted to  
KDI School of Public Policy and Management  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
 
MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
Committee in charge: 
 
 
Professor Yoon Ha Yoo, Supervisor       ______________________ 
 
Professor Ji Hong Kim                  ______________________ 
 
Professor Young Uck Kang              ______________________ 
 
 
Approval as of July    , 2008 
I 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
ESTIMATION OF THE COST OF ADOPTING THE VOLUNTARY MILITARY 
SERVICE IN SOUTH KOREA 
  
By  
 
Lee, Jung Hyoun 
 
 
So far, there have been many studies associated with the military service system. Most of 
those studies focused on the United States Military and its experience shifting from a draft 
system to a voluntary system. There has also been a few studies regarding the military service 
system in South Korea, but most of those studies were not an analysis of the cost of adopting 
a voluntary system but were arguments about the cost of a draft system and possible 
directions for improvement. Also, preceding studies have only dealt with the allocative cost, 
which is the social cost generated in the process of random selection of draftees, under the 
selective draft system implemented in the U.S. However, there are some limits to applying 
the U.S. case to South Korea because South Korea has implemented the all-draft system, not 
the selective draft system. Thus, this paper introduces the concept of deadweight loss, which 
is the social costs caused by misallocation of labor resources between the military sector and 
the civilian sectors and estimates the cost of switching to the voluntary system in South 
Korea. The finding shows that the financial cost of voluntary system would be around 7,020 
billion won if the Army keeps the current force strength of 450,000 with 36 month military 
service per draftee. For the estimation, I used the baseline projection in the Military Reform 
2020 as the demand for the military manpower and the cumulative distribution of draft-
eligible men by each civilian pay level as the available supply of military manpower.  
 
II 
Also, this study examines the prospects of the transition from the current draft system to a 
voluntary system. Because the projected financial cost exceeds the present Army personnel 
budget of 5,700 billion won, it seems impractical to implement the voluntary system all at 
once. However, given the enormous economic cost associated with the current draft system, it 
may be well worth for the South Korean government and the Ministry of National Defense to 
prepare for the transition to a voluntary system.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose of Study 
The ability to defend one’s sovereignty is essential to the existence of a nation. No matter 
how prosperous a country is economically, it will always be exposed to constant external 
threats if it does not have a strong defensive force. History teaches us that countries with 
weak defensive forces invariably succumbed to external threats and invasions. Therefore, all 
over the world, countries are making constant efforts to build up optimal defensive forces for 
themselves, while taking into account various factors such as their economic power, external 
threats, past war experiences and so on. 
 
National defense power consists of labor resources and capital equipment.  Labor resources 
mean military manpower, which can conveniently be divided into three categories: (1) 
Commissioned officers on active duty, (2) Non-commissioned officers on active duty, and (3) 
Soldiers on active duty. Capital equipment is composed of factors such as weapons, military 
installations, land, and so forth. Generally, capital equipment is procured at market price. Of 
course, a part of capital equipment can be requisitioned by the compulsion, but it is difficult 
to requisition the capital equipment except during wartime because of compensation issues in 
peace. Military manpower can also be acquired from the civilian sector, but the methods of 
acquisition of manpower are fundamentally different from that of capital equipment. 
Acquisition of military personnel can be divided into two categories: one is to acquire 
military personnel by imposing military duty by the military service law; the other is to fill 
military personnel requirements with volunteers. The former category is called the “draft 
system” and the latter is called the “voluntary system.”  
 
2 
As stipulated in Article 39 of the constitution of the Republic of Korea, “All citizens have the 
duty of national defense under the conditions as prescribed by law.” As a result, South Korea 
adopted the draft system. And the constitution also states, “Nobody must be disadvantaged 
from performance of their military duty.” The constitution regards personnel on reservist duty 
who perform military service in other sectors except for the armed forces as personnel who 
discharge their military service obligation. Namely, South Korea has the all-draft system 
1
among the draft systems. At this point, the military service system of South Korea is 
different from the military service system of the U.S. which has the selective draft system 
(what we call, Military Selective Service) in the 1960s. The U.S. satisfied military manpower 
requirements with volunteers at first, and then conscripted the rest of the requirements with 
the draft system. 
 
South Korea has maintained the all-draft system for sixty years since the “Draft Law” was 
enacted in May of 1951. Of course, arguments for and against the draft system has been 
continuing for just as long. Supporters for the draft system have taken the position that the 
implementation of the draft system as a mean to procure military manpower has been 
inevitable under the present quasi-state of war as the face-off between North and South Korea 
continues, and that the all-draft system played a positive role in the improvement of the 
technological skills of the civilian sector until 1970. On the other hand, opponents of the draft 
system insist that a draft system hampers economic development by conscripting personnel 
into the military when otherwise their capabilities and potentials could have been put to better 
use. In fact, out of current military personnel in active service, college and university 
graduates make up to 80 percent of military personnel. So, opponents of the draft system 
emphasize that the government should abolish the draft system and switch to a voluntary 
                                            
1 So-called “Universal Military Service System”  
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system. Also, some of the social issues such as draft dodging, suicide during military service, 
and conscientious objection to mandatory military service offer them good excuses as to why 
the government should seriously examine a transition to the voluntary system.  
 
However, we find that many countries in the world still have the draft system as their 
manpower procurement system. In spite of the many inherent problems in the draft system, 
many countries still keep the draft system due to its advantages. Consequently, we need to 
study various aspects of both the draft and voluntary systems in more detail. 
 
In this paper, the theoretical background of the draft and voluntary systems will be examined 
and attempts will be made to estimate how much cost will be incurred if the present draft 
system is converted to a voluntary system. For this purpose, the U.S., which moved from the 
draft into a voluntary system in 1973, will serve as a good example. Especially the transition 
from the draft to the voluntary system will be very similar to what the U.S. has done, even 
though the U.S. didn’t have the all-draft system like South Korea.  
 
1.2. Scope of Research and Methodologies 
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Chapter 2, I will take a closer look at theoretical 
background of the draft and voluntary system in relation to the social cost, the equity of tax 
burden, and other issues. In Chapter 3, I will estimate the financial cost and economic cost 
South Korea has been forced to incur due to the all-draft system, and in Chapter 4, I will 
estimate the financial cost and economic cost if South Korea replaces the present draft system 
with a voluntary system, and will analyze the outcome by examining the supply and demand 
for military manpower. Finally, I will examine the prospects of replacing the current draft 
system with voluntary system based on the estimation made in Chapter 4.  
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This paper has limited scope. First, the Army is the only subject of study when we estimate 
the cost of the voluntary system because the Army accounts for more of the total combined 
armed forces than the Air force and Navy in terms of the number of men, and because the 
Army will be most affected by the introduction of the voluntary system. Secondly, we will 
assume the force strengths (demand of military manpower) are taken to be exogenous. 
Namely, the purpose of this paper is to estimate cost depending on the given demand for 
military personnel from the Army, not to compute the optimal force strengths. Third, the 
object of analysis is only limited to soldiers, not commissioned officers or noncommissioned 
officers. We will assume that commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers are 
volunteers. Lastly, “men eligible for the draft” are those who qualify under current physical 
fitness, moral, and mental standards for military service regardless of their level of education. 
In other word, as long as they passed the basic requirements, it would not make any 
difference in their ability to accomplish their missions even if all the new draftees graduated 
only from high school.  
 
All materials in estimating cost are from 2006 and the most recent data were used in instances 
where there weren’t current data available.  
 
2. The Theoretical Background of the Draft and Voluntary system 
Opinions about a draft and voluntary system vary depending on the era and the respective 
country in question. There are many opinions related to the pros and cons of the draft and 
voluntary system, but many previous studies agree that the draft system induces additional 
social costs as compared with a voluntary system. Also, it is recognized that the draft system 
induces the problem of equity of tax burden by imposing an implicit tax on draftees, collected 
5 
in the form of direct labor services. There are, however, some issues which have not been 
properly dealt with in earlier studies in recognizing the social costs of a draft system, so I will 
introduce that concept, and reexamine the issues from a different perspective.    
 
2.1. The Social Cost  
2.1.1. Allocative Cost 
So far, many studies have focused on the theoretical background of how much more cost the 
draft system would entail than the voluntary system. With regard to the social cost associated 
with the draft system, there are two well-known studies; “The economics cost of the draft” by 
Walter Y. Oi, and “Economics of the military draft” by Hansen & Weisbrod. The two studies 
pointed out that the minimum total forgone civilian labor productivity under the voluntary 
system is smaller than that of the draft system because the draft system induces additional 
social costs in making selections among men eligible for the draft without reference, in 
general, to their opportunity cost. 
 
Walter Y. Oi divided accessions into three groups: volunteers, reluctant volunteers, and 
draftees. Then, he computed the economic cost by asking how much should be paid to make 
reluctant volunteers and draftees who enlist in the armed forces. Hansen & Weisbrod noted 
that the draft system induces the distributive effects between servicemen and civilians. The 
draftees receive relatively low military pay instead of civilian opportunity cost. That means 
the difference between the two is an implicit tax on the draftees. This implicit tax on draftees-
which involves a redistribution of income from draftees to civilians-is what he means by 
“distributive effects.” Also, he said that the draft system constrains the labor mobility, given 
individual utility functions, and produces a variety of uncertainty effects for both private 
employers and potential draftees. As a result, the draft created distortion in the allocation of 
6 
labor resource between military and civilian sector. In addition, they insisted that the draft 
system increases additional training and administrative cost within the military sector due to 
the frequent turnover rate of military manpower. He called these cost “allocative-efficiency 
cost”.   
 
Two studies refer the occurrence of the allocative cost as the social cost of the draft system. 
This allocative cost, however, disappear if every man is mandated to serve in the military 
because there is no men left the civilian sector. To get clearer picture, it would be helpful if 
we classify the draft system into the selective draft system and all-draft system. The all-draft 
system is a military service system in which all men are drafted into the armed forces as a 
serviceman on active duty, while the selective draft system is a military service system which 
randomly selected men are drafted into the armed forces as long as supplies of volunteers fall 
short of fulfilling requirements for the strength objectives. 
 
1) Allocative cost of the Selective draft system  
Figure 1: Allocative Cost of the Selective Draft System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b 
f 
d 
N N1 N2 
S 
Sa 
a 
c 
P1 
M 
V 
h 
7 
 
Figure 1 explains the allocative cost of the selective draft system that the U.S implemented in 
the 1960s. The supply curve of military personal, measured by each individual’s marginal 
productivity in the civilian sector is given by S. In Figure 1, Sa is the average productivity. In 
Figure l, under the voluntary system the forgone total product in civilian sector is N1N2dp1 if 
the armed forces employ N1N2. Since the average product at this level of military 
employment is N2b, by multiplying it with N1N2, we can have another equivalent total 
product measure, N1N2bV.  
 
Under the draft system, however, N1N2 is randomly selected from N1N, the total number of 
eligible men. Therefore, the average product is not N2b but NSa(=N1M), and the associated 
total product foregone is N1McN2, which is larger than N1VbN2. The difference between two 
is VMcb, the dotted area in the Figure, and is referred as the social cost of the selective draft 
system in the literature. Hansen & Weisbrod called this cost “labor-mobility cost” and regard 
it as a part of allocative efficiency cost. Another ways of representing the same cost is to draw 
a line from P1 that passes through the mid-point of MC line segment; then the area covered 
by the triangle P1hd represents the same social cost, which comes from the fact that the 
selection is made randomly with no regard to the opportunity cost foregone.  
 
To sum up, the social cost of the selective draft system means allocative cost due to the 
random selection of draftees among labor pool without reference of civilian opportunity cost.   
 
2) Allocative cost of the all-draft system  
In the case of South Korea which has implemented the all-draft system, there is no allocative 
social cost, like that of the U.S., because all eligible men are drafted into the armed forces, 
8 
and therefore there is no selection involved. Figure 2 shows the allocative cost of the all-draft 
system. S is the cumulative distribution of values of civilian labor productivity for all men 
and Sa is the average curve of S. 
 
Figure 2: Allocative Cost of the All-draft system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, to employ labor resources of ON in the military sector, the foregone total civilian 
labor productivity is ONfa under the voluntary system, and OM (=ONfa / ON) is the 
corresponding average. On the other hand, under all-draft system the foregone total civilian 
labor productivity to employ ON is also ONfa; it is same as the total civilian labor 
productivity lost in the voluntary system. Namely, there is no additional allocative cost 
induced by the draft system. Strange as it may sound, it is [very] intuitively reasonable. 
Considering the fac that the allocative cost of the selective draft system is produced by a 
random selection from all draftable men, the allocative cost by randomness and uncertainty is 
not produced under the all-draft system since it is mandatory for all qualified men should 
enlist in the armed forces. 
 
Consequently, the claim that the voluntary system is better than the draft system because the 
draft system involves allocative distortion, appears not applicable to at least the all-draft 
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system since the all-draft system doesn’t produce additional allocative cost. However, we 
should be careful here in that the allocative cost means only the cost produced in the process 
of procurement of draftees to replenish the shortage for the strength objective besides 
volunteers not total social costs of draft system. The reason that the preceding studies didn’t 
make a statement about the allocative cost of all-draft system is associated with the fact that 
the U.S. didn’t implement the all-draft system at that time. Accordingly, we need to take a 
look at other aspects of the social cost besides the allocative cost. 
 
2.1.2. Deadweight Loss 
If we consider only the allocative cost of the kind mentioned above we can be misled to think 
that the all-draft system is better than the selective draft system. However, that is because the 
preceding studies didn’t deal with optimal allocation of labor resources between civilian 
sector and military sector. The preceding studies only covered how much cost would be 
produced given the size of the force strengths, taking military manpower “need” as 
exogenously given without considering optimal allocation of labor resources. Thus, in this 
part, let’s examine how the deadweight loss is produced by misallocation of the labor 
resources between the civilian sector and the military sectors. 
 
Let’s suppose that industry consists of the civilian sector and the military sectors.   If so, the 
qualified men in a specific age group (in the case of South Korea: from 19 to 31 years old) 
will be hired by either in the civilian or military sectors.   
 
N = Mn + Cn                                                                             (1) 
N: Total men hired by the military and the civilian sectors   
Mn: the number of men hired by military sector   
10 
Cn: the number of men hired by civilian sector   
 
Figure 3 shows the marginal productivity of the military and the civilian sectors as  hire one 
labor unit, respectively. Right downward curve shows the marginal productivity (MP) size as 
military sector hires one labor unit, and left downward curve shows the marginal productivity 
size as civilian sector hires one labor unit. Generally, we can say that the MP of last labor unit 
of military sector (point g) is lower than civilian sector because the MP of surplus labor of 
military sector is very low if the armed forces have attained enough strength forces required. 
That’s why the lowest pay of the military is less than that of the civilian sectors. Under the 
draft system we can often see that the draftees are made to do fatigue duty, which shows a 
typical example of why the MP of surplus labor of the military is very low. 
 
Figure 3: Marginal Productivity of the Military and the Civilian Sectors 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3, the real output of society will be maximized at the point e, which is the 
intersection of the MP curve of military sector and the MP curve of civilian sector. Namely, 
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the optimal allocation of labor resources is to allocate the ON
*
 (Mn) number of men to the 
military sector and NN
*
 (Cn) number of men to the civilian sector. For example, the MP of 
military sector is higher than the MP of civilian sector for the labor resources of ON1. So, in 
this case, the military sector will increase employment of labor resources to the right side 
until ON
*
. On the other hand, if the MP of civilian sector is higher than the MP of military 
sector for the labor of ON2, the civilian sector will increase the employment of labor 
resources to the left side until NN
*
. Finally, the national total output will be maximized when 
both sectors hire ON
*
 men and NN
*
men, respectively. 
 
From now on, let’s assume that the military and civilian sectors are in free-market. If so, the 
MP is the same as the pay level when both sectors should give to the labor sources employed. 
If there is no restriction in the market, military and civilian sectors will employ N
*
 men at the 
pay, P
*
, respectively. That is because military and civilian sectors do not have any reason to 
employ additional labor if its pay level is higher than the MP of labor by employing per one 
labor unit.  
 
Here, the assumption of free-market is the same as the voluntary system in the light of 
military service system because under the voluntary system individuals select whether he 
applies for the armed forces or works for the civilian sector considering his opportunity cost 
as compared with given level of pay, P. Under the draft system, however, the military doesn’t 
have any interest about optimal allocation of labor resources because the military sector can 
conscript the military manpower requirement irrespective of their civilian opportunity cost 
and intention. Therefore, the draft system produces deadweight loss by employing labor 
resources in excess of optimal labor by artificially setting the pay low from society’s 
standpoint. It is no wonder that the draft system induces deadweight loss because the civilian 
12 
labor with a high MP is employed by the military sector which requires lower MP. 
 
The size of deadweight loss is different under the selective draft system and all-draft system. 
In Figure 3, the size of deadweight loss of the selective draft system is measured to ∆ecd 
when pay level is P1. Under the voluntary system the military sector can only employ labor of 
ON1 at the artificial P1. However, since the military sector can conscript mandatory military 
personnel under the draft system, the military sector will employ the labor resources by ON2 
until the MP curve of military sector meets with P1. As a result, since the civilian sector can 
not employ the labor quantity of N
*
N2, deadweight loss is produced as much as ∆ecd. 
 
On the other hand, the size of deadweight loss of the all-draft system is ∆egf, which is larger 
than the size of the selective draft system. In case of the all-draft system, the level of pay is 
set at the P2 lower than P1 because military sector can conscript all qualified men with low 
pay level. That is, the military sector sets the pay level to the MP of the last labor unit. As the 
military sector uses all labor quantity of ON, which is larger than optimal labor quantity of 
ON,
*
 as a result, there is no labor quantity that the civilian sector can use. Therefore, as the 
civilian sector doesn’t use labor resources of N*N, which would attain the higher MP, the all-
draft system produces deadweight loss of ∆egf, which is larger than deadweight loss (∆ecd) 
under the selective draft system.  
 
It is definitely true that the draft system produces the deadweight loss regardless of the 
category of draft system. Namely, the draft system reduces real national product below the 
level which could be attained with any given level of aggregate resource use by allocating 
labor in excess of optimal labor level to the military sector. Actually, the allocation of labor 
resource between the military and civilian sectors is very important because we can have a 
13 
limit to recognize the exact social cost of the draft system, if only we consider allocative cost 
produced in process of selection of draftees without consideration for the deadweight loss 
caused by the misallocation of labor resources.  
 
Let’s turn to the social cost of a selective draft system and all-draft system. Now, we can say 
that social cost of the selective draft system is the sum of deadweight loss (∆ecd) produced by 
using the additional labor resources of N
*
N2 and the allocative cost (MVbc in Figure 1) 
produced by selecting the labor resource of N1N2 randomly out of ON. This is illustrated by 
the following Figure 4. Here, the size of MVbc in Figure 1 is same as the size of ∆bdh. So the 
social cost is the size of becdh 
 
Figure 4: The Social Cost of the Selective Draft System 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the social cost of all-draft system is only deadweight loss (∆egf) produced 
by using all men (additional labor resource of N
*
N), but the allocative cost is not produced 
under the all-draft system.   
 
Then, how can we measure the size of the deadweight loss? As we see in Figure 3, we have to 
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find the equilibrium of military labor market and measure the marginal productivity of the 
excess labor resources. However, it is not easy to find the equilibrium of military labor 
market. To do so, we need to express many variables numerically to decide which force 
strengths level is optimal from a national standpoint, but there are many limits. Especially, 
some variables such as the security threat, historical experience and nation sentiments are 
very difficult to express numerically. So, many preceding studies have focused on the 
allocative cost rather than deadweight loss in connection to the social cost. However, there is 
no room for doubt that the social cost of the draft system should be considered the 
deadweight loss. 
 
2.2. The Equity of Tax Burden   
So far, we know that the draft system produces the social cost such as deadweight loss and 
allocative cost as compared with the voluntary system, and does not maximize national total 
output. On the other hand, another issue associated with the draft system is about the equity 
of tax burden. As mentioned above, the military uses additional labor resources through 
conscription, except for volunteers, under the draft system. Since the draftees receive lower 
military pay than their civilian pay, the difference of pay is induced between two sectors. So, 
unfavorable distributive effects occur to the draftees. That is because the current draft system 
imposes an implicit income tax on draftees by letting the draftees receive low military pay 
and give up their civilian pay. If draftees were not thusly “taxed,” taxpayers would pay larger 
explicit taxes under the voluntary system. Figure 5 shows how much the implicit income tax 
is under the draft system. 
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Figure 5: Implicit Income Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let’s assume that S, the distribution of labor productivity, is the pay which labor resources 
can receive in the civilian sector. Then, S is the same as the foregone civilian income draftees 
can make under the draft system. Under the selective draft system, the foregone total civilian 
income of draftees of N1N2 is the N1N2db, and the actual total military income of draftees is 
the N1N2bc. So, the draftees are imposed an implicit income tax of ∆bcd, which is the 
difference between N1N2db and N1N2bc. On the other hand, under the all-draft system 
implicit income tax imposed on the draftees is aP2gf, and it is larger than that of the selective 
draft system (∆bcd) 
   
Generally speaking, one of the merits of the draft system is to maintain a desired level of 
defense capability alleviating the financial burden for government and the tax burden for 
taxpayers. So, the budget for operating military personnel is N1N2cb, which is the total 
payment of the draftees. However, as we see in Figure 5, the real budget of the Military 
Defense is the sum of N1N2cb and additional ∆bcd. The real cost of the selective draft system 
is sum of the defense budget for operating draftees and the implicit income tax.   
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There is no reason for civilian to object to the draft system because the draft system reduces 
their explicit tax burden. But from a standpoint of a draftee, apparently the draft system 
produces unfavorable distributive effects to them. Accordingly, the equity problem of tax 
burden on the draftees will be continuously raised under the draft system. Actually, during the 
early 1960’ the U.S. society became increasingly concerned with the growing inequity of the 
implicit tax on draftees, but at that time, “Universal Military Training Act” wasn’t really 
“universal,” and the “tax” which it imposed remained selective and discriminatory before 
shifting to the voluntary system. 
 
2.3. Other Issues   
The social cost and equity of tax burden mentioned above are problems between the military 
sector and civilian sectors. However, following issues relevant to the draft system are 
confined largely to problems within the military sector and civilian sectors, respectively. 
 
2.3.1. The Structure of the Military Defense   
The recent warfare has taken up the form of using advanced weapons compared to the use of 
massive military manpower. We can observe the importance of advanced weapons easily 
through examples such as Gulf-war, Iraq-war, and so on. Considering that the defense power 
is composed of the military manpower and capital equipment, strong defense power can be 
attained by the investment for the more capital equipment like advanced weapons. 
 
However, there are some opinions that the draft system has a limit to build up a strong 
defense power because the draft system has a tendency to increase the ratio of labor input. 
The draftees receive low military pay controlled artificially by conscription while the capital 
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equipment is obtained in private, uncontrolled markets. So, the relative price of labor and 
capital equipment is inevitably distorted in the military sector, thus the result is that relatively 
cheaper forces are injected into the military in more numbers than is actually required. That is, 
relatively small investment for the expensive capital equipment brings out military “over 
staffing.” Therefore, the draft system leads the military sector into having manpower-oriented 
troops instead of capital equipment-oriented troops. We can often observe that countries 
implementing draft system have manpower-oriented troops rather than capital equipment-
oriented troops, since they can use labor forces chiefly as compared to countries with 
voluntary system. Finally, the military structure of manpower-oriented troops, which is has a 
limited contribution to building a strong military strength, results from disregarding the 
difference between budgetary cost and opportunity cost of draftees. 
  
2.3.2. Training and Administrative Cost   
Under the draft system the turnover of manpower continuously takes place according to the 
fixed military service periods. If service period is shortened, the rate of turnover will be 
increased, and more and unnecessary training and administrative cost will incur. This means 
the increase of training and administrative cost for the new recruits, and this cost can be ruled 
out completely under the voluntary system. 
 
From the viewpoint of the armed forces, it is very important to keep the number of “ready” 
men (hereinafter denoted as R), not merely the number in uniform (N). That is, men involved 
in training-either as new recruits or as instructors or administrator of these new recruits-are 
not ready, although the instructor-administrator cadre could be withdrawn from those 
activities. So, the military have to increase the draftees to keep R when military service 
period is shortened. Consequently, this results in the increase of training and administrative 
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cost for the recruits. Moreover, this will result in the increase of required training and 
administrative personnel, which will also incur additional cost; this also means that we would 
need more draftees to supplement those training and administrative personnel, who have been 
dispatched elsewhere.   
 
The relationship between R and N can be stated as follows
2
; 
, or  
)1(1 k
s
p
R
N

  
Where: 
S is the average period of service of draftees, in months (1/s is the turnover rate); 
P is the training period for draftees, in month; 
K is the ratio of training personnel to trainees; 
N is number of draftees; and R is combat –ready men. 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of the first expression above indicates the number of 
men in uniform who are in training at a given point in time; the second term indicates the 
number of instructors and administrators, which is assumed to be a fixed fraction of trainees; 
and the final term indicates the number of ready men. It is clear from the equation that if the 
ready men are increased and service period is shortened, then more draftees will be needed. 
In South Korea’s case, the military has kept the number of combat-ready men by shortening 
the period of recruit training when the service periods are shortened. But since the shortening 
of recruit training has a limit, thus excessive shortening of service period is not likely to 
secure the number of combat- ready men. Of course, the training and administrative cost will 
                                            
2 W. Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod, “Economics of the military draft.”1967. 
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go up with the reduction of service period. That’s why the voluntary system can reduce cost 
related with training and administration, if the average duration of service is increased. 
 
2.3.3. Impact on Future Income 
The draft system results in not only the distributive effects of income due to the implicit 
income tax but also as other additional cost. A typical example is the wide gap in income 
difference that arises due to the cessation of college and vocational training due to 
conscription in the military. There has been no precedent in South Korea in regards to the 
wide gap in income difference, however, according to the research carried out by Guido, 
Imbens; Wilbert van der klaauw(1995)
3
, in the case of the Netherlands, the future income 
between those who stopped work due to conscription and those who did not showed 
difference of 5 % in their future income. Also, the results of Angrist’s research (1990)4 show 
that those soldiers who fought in the Vietnam War lost 15% of their potential income. The 
loss of potential income may differ from country to country, however, it can be shown that 
loss of potential income can be observed in the draft system and also the fact the wide gap of 
income difference exists among draftees and the exempted. 
  
2.3.4. The Problem of the Conscientious Objector   
One of the problems caused by the draft system all over the world is whether governments 
permit the right of conscientious objector or not. The U.N. Human Rights Commission has 
repeatedly urged the Korean government to make alternative services available to 
conscientious objectors. However, many countries (North Korea, China, Israel and so on) 
under the draft system do not permit the right of conscientious objector. That is, it shows that 
                                            
3 Guido Imbens; wilvert van der Klaauw,“Evaluation the cost of conscription in the Netherlands”, Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics, Vol. 13, No. 2, JBES Symposium on Program and Policy Evaluation. (APR., 
1995), p.215  
4 Angrist, J. D. (1990), “Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence From Social Security 
Administrative Records,” American Economic Review, 80, 323-335 
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permission of the right of conscientious objector depends on the security situation each 
country has faced with.  
 
South Korea government does not permit conscientious objector to undertake alternative 
service. But, the problem is that, in the past, advocates who agree with the right of 
conscientious objector were confined within specific religious group, now the scope of 
conscientious objector is extended to include people of antiwar, objector for overseas 
dispatch of armed forces, and so forth on the basis of personal conviction. So, opponents and 
advocates for the right of conscientious objector have disputed about this until now. Also, it is 
a practical problem that the government can’t ignore the recommendation of The U.N. 
Human Rights Commission for the human right of minorities.  
 
Also, we can examine the problem about the right of conscientious objector in the light of 
economic cost. Conscientious objector must forgo their civilian opportunity cost by choosing 
to go to the prison rather than taking arms, and they have to cover the expense related with a 
lawsuit. Most of all, the conflict created by the discordance between opponents and advocates 
about the right of conscientious objector will be the most invisible cost. 
 
3. The cost estimation of the draft system   
As pointed out earlier, the social cost of a draft system is the sum of deadweight loss and 
allocative cost. But it is not easy to estimate the size of deadweight loss, thus many preceding 
studies focused on estimating the foregone total civilian earnings related with the allocative 
cost draftees have produced, as taking the force strengths given. They regard it as the cost of 
a draft system. Therefore, the cost of the draft system is the foregone civilian earnings of the 
draftees, which is different from the social cost conceptually.     
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The cost of a draft system can be divided into two. One is the financial cost, and the other is 
the economic cost. The former is the budgetary cost government must pay to the draftees 
implementing the draft system. Thus, financial cost can not reflect the draftee’s civilian 
opportunity cost. On the other hand, the latter is defined as the sum of incomes draftees must 
forgo in civilian sector. The financial cost are the only cost government have to manage, but 
the economic cost is the cost society should recognize. So, it is desirable to regard the 
economic cost as the real cost of the draft system because the draft system just imposes the 
implicit income tax on the draftees instead of the civilian. Now, let’s try to estimate the 
financial cost and economic cost of draft system in South Korea, and examine the difference 
between the two. 
 
3.1. The Financial Cost   
The financial cost, in plain terms, is the expense of operating military personnel (hereinafter 
denoted as EOMP)
5
 out of the military defense budget in a fiscal year. We can estimate the 
financial cost by multiplying the total draftees by annual EOMP per capita, it is described as 
below   
 
Financial cost = Total draftees×Annual EOMP per capita6                    (2) 
 
Total men drafted in the Army are shown in Table 1. Table l shows the status of recruits 
drafted from FY 2002 to FY 2006. Annually, the average recruits of 225K are supplied to the 
Army. Accordingly, we know that the annual total draftees necessary to the army (the force 
                                            
5 It includes labor, meals, and clothing expense 
6 2,746,000=((233,000+226,600+220,000+236,000)/4)*12; National Defense Expense Guide 2006:  sergeant 
233,000 won a month, corporal 226,000 won, private first class 220,000, private 236,000   
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strengths) are about 450K men, considering that the present service period of the draftees is 
24 months. Of course, the necessary military personnel can be changed to some degrees per 
year, but hereafter, the 450K draftees will be fixed as the annual military personnel 
requirement. 
 
Table 1: The Status of the Recruits in the Army     
   Average ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 
Recruits 225,110 231,542 226,744 235,971 224,075 207,221 
Source: Annual Report on the Army Statistics, 2007.    
 
On the other hand, annual EOMP per man was approximately 2,746,000 won in FY 2007. 
Now, we can calculate the annual financial cost, the budgetary expense, by multiplying 
annual total 450K draftees by annual EOMP per man (2,746,000 won). Consequently, the 
financial cost is roughly 1,235 billion won
7
.  If the pay increase and welfare policy of the 
draftees are considered in the future, the financial cost of the present draft system is expected 
to increase largely because the annual EOMP go up continuously.  
  
3.2. The Economic Cost 
The economic cost of a draft system is defined as the foregone total income (opportunity cost) 
of the draftees in civilian sector, and described as followings: 
 
Economic Cost = 

000,450
1n
n
th 
Civilian Income
 
                               (3) 
 
With the above formula, the economic cost is determined by civilian pay level, and the larger 
                                            
7 450,000*2,746,000 = 1,235,700,000,000 won. 
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the civilian pay level is, the larger the economic cost will be. If we know the individual 
civilian payroll, it is very easy to calculate the economic cost of the draft system. But it is 
impossible to know each draftee’s pay level because most of them are students who are not 
yet employed. If so, we have to assume that the individual’s opportunity cost are the same as 
the pay level they would have received in the civilian sector. Generally, the civilian pay level 
is determined by education level and age. Table 2 shows pay level classified by the size by 
worker, education, and age as of 2005. The size by worker was included as one factor to 
determine pay level because the pay level can be differed by the size by worker even under 
same conditions of education and ages
8
. Here, I chose the maximum and minimum pay level 
according to the size by worker.
9
 
 
Table 2: Pay Level by the Size by Worker
10
, Education, Ages  
Education(Male) Age 
Monthly Payment
a 
(won) Annual Payment(won) 
Min Max Min Max  
Under high school   -19 859,012 1,299,920 10,308,144 15,599,040 
High school 20-24 1,134,795 1,312,131 13,617,540 15,745,572 
Junior college 20-24 1,197,437 1,313,389 14,369,244 15,760,668 
College & University 20-24 1,123,877 1,560,316 13,486,524 18,723,792 
Source: http://www.kosis.kr 
a. Regular payments and overtime payment except for annual special payment  
 
In Table 2, there is little difference in payment between a man with a high school degree and 
a man with a college degree, it is interpreted as the difference caused by their career. I 
selected age groups of 20∼24 in the statistics because the 95 percent11 of draftees were men 
between the ages of 20 and 23. 
 
                                            
8 Of course, pay level can be classified by the standards of industrial sectors. 
9 See Appendix 1.   
10 Worker by size: 5~9, 10~29, 30~99, 100~299, 300~499, over 500  
11 Military Manpower Administration, “Annual Report on military affairs”, vol. 37.   
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Next, let’s see about the educational attainment of the draftees in the Army.  However, it is 
not possible to divide the draftees into the detailed educational groups, since the Military 
Manpower Administration (MMA) classifies the recruits with three educational groups; under 
high school, high school, over university including junior college. Table 3 shows the annual 
number of draftees and proportion of educational attainment. In Table 3, we can see how the 
annual draftees of 225,110 are classified with educational attainment.  
 
Table 3: Annual Number of Draftees Classified by Educational Attainment 
Year 
Under high school  High school  Over university 
Percentage (%) Number Percentage (%) Number Percentage (%) Number 
02’ 0 0 23.9 55,339 76.1 176,203 
03’ 0 0 25.7 58,273 74.3 168,471 
04’ 0.1 237 20.0 47,194 79.9 188,540 
05’ 4.0 8,963 17.0 38,092 79.0 177,020 
06’ 3.8 7,874 15.6 32,326 80.6 167,021 
Average  1.58 3,415 20.4 46,244 78.0  175,451 
Source: Military Manpower Administration, “Annual Report on military affairs, vol. 35, 36, 37”.   
 
Now, we can calculate the annual economic cost of the recruits by multiplying the pay level 
classified with educational degrees of Table 2 by the annual number of recruits classified with 
educational degrees of Table 3. And the annual total economic cost of draftees can be 
estimated by adding up the annual economic cost of recruits to the economic cost of the 
existing draftees last year. At this point, let’s assume that the economic cost of the existing 
draftees is same as that of the recruits. As a result, the estimated annual total economic cost of 
draft system in South Korea is roughly the maximum 8,132 billion and minimum 6,062 
billion in Table 4. 
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Table 4: The Economic Cost of the Draft System  
 
Number
a 
(man) 
Annual payment (won) 
Economic cost      
(billion won) 
Min Max Minb Maxc 
Under high school 6,830 10,308,144 15,599,040 704.0 1,065.0 
High school 92,488 13,617,540 15,745,572 1,259.4 1,456.2 
Junior college - 14,369,244 15,760,668 - - 
College & University 350,902 13,486,524 18,723,792 4,732.4 6,570.2 
Total 450,220 - - 6,062.2 8,132.9 
a. The service period is 24 months, so total number of draftees will be the double of the number of recruits.  
b. The number  x  the minimum annual payment 
c. The number  x  the maximum annual payment 
 
In conclusion, from the standpoint of the country, the draft system induces the economic cost 
of maximum 8,132 billion and minimum 6,062 billion including the financial cost of 1,235 
billion. That is, the draft system imposes the implicit income tax of the maximum 6,897 
billion and minimum 4,827 billions on the draftees. 
 
So far, we estimated the economic cost and financial cost of the present draft system. As the 
financial cost is lower than the economic cost, the government and taxpayer might prefer the 
draft system, but we can find that the draft system is not cheap military service system 
nationally if we compare the economic cost with the financial cost. Draftees just pay the 
implicit tax at the expense of their civilian earnings, thus the cost society is paying is not 
small at all. Especially, as the economy develops more and more, the gap between the 
economic cost and financial cost will be bigger than before. That is because it is difficult for 
the increase of wage rate of the military sector to surpass the increase of wage rate of the 
civilian sector. Also, it looks like the economic cost of the draft system will increase steadily 
as the percentage of draftees with university degrees goes up among the draftees as we see in 
Table 4. 
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4. The Cost Estimation of Voluntary system   
It is not certain whether there are some debates related to the voluntary system in the military. 
But it is obvious that it is impossible to keep the present draft system asking for many 
draftees as time goes, considering the current viewpoint of draft system, domestic problem of 
military manpower supply, and global trends over the military service system, and so forth. 
However, whether government moves to a voluntary system or not should be determined with 
prudence, since the transition of military service system has big ripple affection on the whole 
community. Accordingly, it is necessary to estimate the cost of a voluntary system to 
determine whether the government moves to a voluntary system or not in the future. 
 
4.1. The Model   
We can deduce the model for the cost estimation of voluntary system from Figure 2 of 
Chapter 2 with a little modification. Under an all-draft system like South Korea, the required 
recruits are drafted by national compulsion. As shown in Figure 6, all men are enforced to 
enlist in the military, and draftees receive low pay (P2) arranged by the government. A 
voluntary system, however, has features which are an elastic demand (D) and a voluntary 
supply (S) on the basis of the given payment. That is, the payroll, Pe, determined in the 
market is higher than P2 of the draft system. So, the payment level of a voluntary system is 
higher than that of draft system (Pe>P2), but demand for the military manpower is less than 
that of draft system (Ne<N) as we see in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Model for the Cost Estimation of a Voluntary system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 6, under a voluntary system there will be no men to enlist in the military, given 
payment level of P2, because the payroll is too low than their marginal productivity. So, the 
pay will go up to the point e and the military will employ the military manpower of Ne for 
the demand without any restriction in labor market. On the other hand, let’s suppose that the 
military needs the number of N of the force strengths. In this situation, it is inevitable to 
procure additional military manpower (N-O) to keep the strength forces of N men. These 
additional military manpower needs (N-O) can be supplied with payment level of P1 under 
the voluntary system. Thus, if the government plans to convert the draft system to a 
voluntary system right now, the economic cost will be boiled down the size of ONca. That is, 
to estimate the cost of a voluntary system we have to know how much payment should be 
raised to attract the reluctant draftees to the armed forces, given the strength objectives.  
 
On the other hand, the financial (budgetary) cost of P2bcP1 is bigger than P2bca because 
P2bca means just the economic cost. Of course, if the military can differentiate the 
volunteer’s pay level depending on each civilian opportunity cost, the financial (budgetary) 
cost will be the same to the economic cost, but actually it is impossible to apply to various 
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pay level to the volunteers who are the same rank. So, usually the financial (budgetary) cost 
is bigger than the economic cost.   
 
4.2. The Cost Estimation   
We need a demand and supply curve in military labor market to estimate the cost as we see in 
Figure 6. So, let’s see the aspects of demand and supply of military manpower in South Korea 
and then, let’s try to calculate the cost of the voluntary system. 
 
4.2.1. The Military Manpower Supply Curve 
It is necessary to separate the volunteers from the draftees to get the supply curve for the 
military labor. That is because some of military men may be volunteers regardless of military 
pay level under the draft system. However, it appears that volunteers are rare, although there 
are not enough surveys and studies done in South Korea. We will only be able to regard the 
military manpower who applies for the noncommissioned officer in the middle of his service 
as volunteers. However, the annual number of these volunteers is about 2,000, which is less 
than one percentage of the annual recruits of 225,000men drafted. So, it would be no problem 
even if we assume there is no volunteer in South Korea among draftees. That means all draft-
eligible men can be volunteers if the military pay is larger than their opportunity cost when 
they compare the military pay with their civilian opportunity cost. Of course, all men don’t 
determine whether they enlist in the armed force or not with only factor of pay level, but here 
I will exclude other factors such as religion, personal faith, and so forth for the convenience 
of analysis. 
 
As noted above, we need to know each individual opportunity cost to induce supply curve, 
but it is not easy to know it. The first problem is to determine who the qualified men are. In 
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case of South Korea, all 19-year-old men
12
 are obligated to have physical examination for 
conscription, and they are classified into men passed or men rejected. We call men passed 
draft-eligible men. they are classified into the active duty or reservist duty again. So it is 
reasonable to regard the draft-eligible men out of men born in specific year as manpower 
supply pool. Of course, when The Military supplements the recruits annually, 19-year-old 
men don’t compose of all recruits. But on average, it is obvious that the men born in a 
specific year supply the shortfall of military manpower of a specific year.   
 
Table 5: The Status of Physical Examination for Conscript 
Year 
Pass (active duty, reservist duty) Fail  
Sub 
total 
University 
High 
school 
High school 
dropouts 
Middle 
school 
Physical /mental 
defect 
04 310,994 225,903 73,927 10,047 1,117 12,007 
05 302,367 221,864 71,741 7,763 999 11,011 
06 291,945 217,351 67,896 5,942 756 10,642 
07 301,930 228,580 67,080 5,569 630 10,865 
Average  301,809 223,424 70,161 7,330 876 11,132 
Source: Military Manpower Administration, “Annual Report on military affairs, vol. 37.” 
 
The status of physical examination for conscript during the last four years appears in Table 5. 
As a result, on average 301,809 males passed the examination, 11,132 males didn’t pass the 
examination. Of males who passed the examination, the university graduates were 223,424, 
and the high school graduates were 70,171, and under high school male were 8,206. So, the 
available number of supply labor resources will be the average 301,809 males who passed the 
physical examination for conscript.   
  
The second problem is to determine the individual opportunity cost. In other words, given the 
                                            
12 The qualified man can be woman, but that is out of the range in this paper. 
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pay level, who will be the volunteers out of the draft-eligible men? If we assume that the 
individuals opportunity cost is same as the civilian pay of them, we can presume whether the 
individual enlists in the armed forces or not with two ways. First thing is to assume that males 
having the lower civilian opportunity cost will enlist in the armed forces voluntarily by 
applying the pay level by education degree to all draftable men. Hence, the order of enlisting 
in the military will be the under high school, high school, and university graduates. This 
method is similar to the method of estimating the economic cost of the draft system. However, 
the first method has a demerit which can not reflect other factors of opportunity cost because 
the present opportunity cost is classified by only one factor, pay level by educational degrees. 
Also, the first method can bring about social misunderstanding as if the qualification of 
enlisting in the armed forces is determined by academic careers. So this method has a limit as 
a method to judge individual opportunity cost.   
 
The second method is to estimate the number of volunteers as given each pay level, then to 
regard the pay level as each volunteer’s opportunity cost. Thus, we can say this method is a 
reasonable because this makes volunteers determine their opportunity cost by themselves by 
reflecting various factors as well as educational degrees as their opportunity cost.  
 
However, it is impossible to ask all men individually which pay level is necessary to be a 
volunteer. So, if we check the distribution of pay level of men aged 19 to 24 having the duty 
of national defense in the civilian sector, we can know how the pay of average annual draft-
eligible men aged 19 (301,809 men) will be distributed in the future. Table 6 shows the 
distribution of workers in civilian sector by pay level and we applied the average annual 
draft-eligible men of 301,809 to the distribution of workers by each pay level in the civilian 
sector. 
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Table 6: The Distribution of Workers (aged 19~24) by Civilian Pay Level and Average 
Annual Draft-eligible Men (aged 19) in 2006 
Pay level 
(thousand 
won) 
Annual Pay 
(thousand 
won) 
Number of 
worker 
(19~24) 
Percentage Draft-
eligible men 
Cumulative Draft-
eligible men 
     1.000 301,809   301,809   
800 9,600 12,323 0.068 20,398  20,398  
900 10,800 10,561 0.058 17,481  37,879  
1,000 12,000 12,642 0.069 20,926  58,805  
1,100 13,200 17,119 0.094 28,336  87,142  
1,200 14,400 18,440 0.101 30,523  117,666  
1,300 15,600 19,909 0.109 32,955  150,621  
1,400 16,800 16,339 0.090 27,045  177,667  
1,500 18,000 14,662 0.080 24,269  201,937  
1,600 19,200 13,360 0.073 22,114  224,051  
1,700 20,400 10,883 0.060 18,014  242,066  
1,800 21,600 7,568 0.042 12,527  254,593  
1,900 22,800 5,853 0.032 9,688  264,281  
2,000 24,000 4,850 0.027 8,028  272,310  
2,200 26,400 5,948 0.033 9,845  282,155  
2,400 28,800 4,602 0.025 7,617  289,773  
2,600 31,200 2,247 0.012 3,719  293,492  
2,800 33,600 1,669 0.009 2,762  296,255  
3,000 36,000 940 0.005 1,555  297,811  
3,500 42,000 1,209 0.007 2,001  299,812  
4,000 48,000 877 0.005 1,451  301,264  
4,500 54,000 171 0.001 283  301,547  
5,000 60,000 129 0.001 213  301,761  
6,000 72,000 19 0.000 31  301,792  
7,000 84,000 10 0.000 16  301,809  
Source: http://www.kosis.kr 
 
In Table 6, the first column and the second column show monthly pay level and annual pay 
level, respectively. The third column is the distribution of workers aged 19 to 24 by each 
civilian pay level, and the fourth column is the percentage of workers at given each pay level. 
Here, the distribution of workers by pay level is described as below. 
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Figure 7: The Distribution of Workers by Civilian Pay Level 
 
 
 
Figure 7 is not a normal distribution, but it is close to the normal distribution. So, if we 
assume that the average annual draft-eligible men follow this above distribution, their 
distribution will be the fifth column in Table 6. Now, it is possible to draw the supply curve 
of military personnel based on the cumulative distribution of the draft-eligible men by the 
annual pay level. Supply curve is as follows. 
 
Figure 8: Supply Curve of Annual Military Manpower 
  
 
Annual 
Pay 
N  
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If the Army moves to a voluntary system in 2007, the supply curve the Army faces will be 
like that of Figure 8. From this supply curve, we can see how much the draft-eligible men 
enlist at given each military pay level. Also, we can estimate the cost of transition to the 
voluntary system throughout the supply curve. For example, if the Army decided to select the 
required recruits of 200,000 men with voluntary supplies of personnel, the Army should pay 
18,000K won to each recruit annually to secure the planned military manpower. 
 
However, the actual supply curve the Army faces might be different from the supply curve 
above. First, we assumed that the distribution of the draft-eligible men follows the 
distribution of the workers by civilian pay level, but this might not be true in reality. We 
selected the distribution of workers aged 19 to 24 by each pay level. But if we enhance the 
age scope from 19~24 to 19~29, it is totally different story. Usually, more workers are 
distributed in the age group of 25~29 than 19~24. That is because most of the men aged 
20~24 are students, or they serve in the military instead of having a job. That means men 
aged 25 to 29 are distributed to high pay level rather than low pay level relatively. As a result, 
pay level by age group of 19 to 24 is likely to be biased downward than pay level of age 
group of 19 to 29.  
 
Second, even though the distribution of the draft-eligible men follows the above distribution, 
the pay level was the only opportunity cost of the draft-eligible men as they work in the 
civilian sector. But, in reality, if the draft-eligible men have aversion about the military 
service the Army should pay them more money than volunteers. Walter Y. Oi explains this as 
follows; when the civilian payroll (C) is the same as the military payroll (M0), an individual 
with an aversion for service live would elect to remain in civil life. If so, the military should 
give more military payroll (M1) to the individual, thus they will be the volunteers only when 
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following condition of M1=(1+δ)C is satisfied depending on each individual’s aversion 
degrees to the military life. In other words, the δ is an equalizing differential which makes 
an individual indifferent between employments in the two sectors. Walter Y. Oi called 
equalizing deferential δ occupational preferences. Consequently, the above mentioned 
distribution may not reflect these occupational preferences. 
 
Third, above supply curve is not only what the Army faces but also what the Navy and the 
Air Force face. So, depending on individual preference, some will choose the Navy and the 
Air force under the same condition of military payroll, thus the supplies of labor for the Army 
could be smaller than before. But, let’s suppose all draft-eligible men will choose the Army 
first in estimating cost since then. Even so, there is no problem because the total cost of the 
military is not changed. 
 
Lastly, the supplies of labor by the pay level can be differed according to unemployment rate. 
Stuart H. Altman & Alan E. Fechter said that unemployment rate has a positive relationship 
with the supplies of military manpower in their paper.  They stated that a rate of voluntary 
enlistment with the 5.5% of unemployment rate is higher than the 4% of unemployment, and 
a pay increase with the 5.5% of unemployment rate is smaller than the 4% of unemployment 
to attract the reluctant volunteers, when they assumed that the unemployment rate was the 4% 
and the 5.5%, respectively. There is no research pertained with an unemployment rate in 
South Korea yet, but we can expect more males will enlist in the Army, if unemployment rate 
is high. In other words, it is possible for men to serve in the Army although the Army payroll 
is lower than their civilian opportunity cost. However, it seems that the more demonstrative 
studies are required about this. For example, job seeker say, “unemployment rate is too high, 
so it is not easy to get a job,” but they still avoid   working for the small and medium 
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companies in spite of an adequate supply of jobs. Hence, it is dangerous to affirm whether 
volunteers would be enough with a high unemployment rate without actual studies in South 
Korea. 
 
4.2.2. The Military Manpower Demand Curve  
The demand
13
 for the military manpower is determined by various factors such as national 
income, military pay level, the rental cost of military capital, international tension, and 
national security, and so forth. Of course, the demand for military manpower is determined 
minimizing the total foregone civilian real output. But, as pointed out earlier, it is not easy to 
determine how much demand is the optimal level for the society. So let’s assume that the 
strength forces is given from outside on the demand side. Here, the outside means the 
Military Defense. Namely, the demand for military personnel is determined by the Military 
Defense as a whole given the supply curve under the draft system. Of course, even with the 
voluntary system, the Military Defense still remains as a decision maker for the demand for 
military manpower. If there are different points between two systems, under all-draft system 
all qualified men should be drafted in terms of the equity of military service by coercive 
power, while under voluntary system the necessary military manpower are supplied by the 
volunteers.  
 
If so, which level are the optimal force strengths for the Army. The Military Defense made a 
statement the strengths objectives to be kept until 2020 by the Military Defense Reform Law 
(anther name is Military Reform 2020). The Military Defense stated that it will reduce the 
current (2006) force strengths including officers and noncommissioned officers from 680,000 
                                            
13 L=L(Y,w,r,I), Y= national income, w=the military wage, r=the rental cost of military capital, and I= a 
measure of international security conditions. (Larry deboer & B. Wade Brorsen)  
Larry deboer & B. Wade Brorsen. “The Demand for and Aupply of Military Labor.” southern economic jounal 
(1989): 857. 
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to 564,000 by 2010, to 560,000 by 2015, and to 500,000 by 2020. Also it stated that the ratio 
of officer and noncommissioned officer should be the 40 percentage by the law enacted. 
Based on the stated force strengths by the law, if we estimate the number of soldiers needed, 
the result is described as below. 
 
Table 7: The Force Strengths by the Military Reform 2020 
Unit: ten thousand 
  2006 2010 2015 2020 
Total 68 64 56 50 
Officer & NC officer 17 18 19 20 
Soldiers 51 46 37 30 
The Army
a 45 40 31 24 
Other services 6 6 6 6 
Source: computed by author from data using the Military Reform 2020  
a. It is estimated under the assumption that the number of soldier of the Navy and Air Force are fixed  
 
In Table 7, the military manpower requirement will be 300,000 men by 2020, which is the 
reduced military manpower by up to 210,000 as compared with 510,000 as of 2006. In the 
case of the Army, the present force strengths are 450,000 as of 2006, but it seems to be 
reduced to 240,000 by 2020, which is the reduced manpower by up to the 40 percentage 
compared with 2006. Here, 240,000 men is the necessary military manpower under the draft 
system, but even under the voluntary system, we can presume over 240,000 men will not be 
needed any more since 2020.  
 
Therefore, I will apply the force strengths determined by the Army to the demand for the 
military manpower. Also, since the service period affects the demand for military labor, I will 
explain about this later in estimating the cost. 
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4.2.3. The Equilibrium in the Military Labor Market 
The equilibrium in the military labor market is determined between the demand and supply of 
military manpower. However, since we assume that the demand for military labor is given 
from the Army, the equilibrium in market is determined by the supply of military manpower. 
That is because the Military Defense should secure the necessary military manpower no 
matter how high the pay level is. For example, if the numbers of recruit requirements are 
100,000 men annually, Military Defense will give the military pay corresponding with the 
civilian pay of the reluctant volunteers to secure the necessary manpower.   
 
The Figure 9 shows that the equilibrium in the military labor market. At the each equilibrium, 
the payroll and quantity of labor are determined. 
 
Figure 9: The Equilibrium in the Military Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 9, if the demand for the recruits is Q0, the annual pay level of the Army is P0. If the 
Army increases the recruits from Q0 to Q1, the pay increase is needed from P0 to P1. Already 
we assumed Q is the given military demand, thus Q0, Q1, and Q2 stand for the number of 
recruits of the Army like the force strength of 240,000, 310,000, and 400,000, respectively. 
Annual 
pay 
P2 
P0 
P1 
Q1 Q0 Q2 
S 
Recruits 
D2 
D1 D0 
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So, the equilibrium of the military labor market is determined by supply curve in this case. 
 
4.2.4. The Alternative Pay Standard of Equilibrium Price.   
We already mentioned about the equilibrium price in military labor market. However, we 
may have trouble in applying this equilibrium price in reality because the equilibrium price is 
not suitable if it is induced from a biased supply curve with many reasons. So, if we have 
applicable alternative pay standard of equilibrium price, it is a very useful method to estimate 
the cost of a voluntary system. In the light of this point, we need to examine the payroll of the 
Paid-Draft System (PDS)
14
, which has been implemented since November 16, 2007 in South 
Korea. We can’t say this PDS is the same as the voluntary system but is similar to a voluntary 
system because draftees can choose a specific sector they want to serve in the Army with 
their intention.  
 
The service type of PDS is divided into two types. Type 1 is to extend their serve periods 
from 6 months to 18 months after completing their obligatory duty in the Army. Type 2 is to 
serve in the Army for 3 years with obligatory duty. (The present service periods are two 
years). The pay of Type 1 is monthly 1,200K won, the pay of Type 2 is monthly 1,800K won 
including special pay of 600K won 
 
If so, which pay level is applicable to the voluntary system as the alternative pay out of two?  
The selection reason of the men of Type 1 and Type 2 is the same but qualification of men is 
different. In case of Type 1, the qualified applicants are the men who complete the military 
duty service. Namely, they will reenlist in the Army by comparing military pay with their 
civilian opportunity cost. On the other hand, in case of Type 2, applicants are men who still 
                                            
14 Of course, under the present all-draft system the draftees are paid. But the pay level is too low to call it “pay” 
actually. That’s why we call this military system “Paid-draft system” 
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have obligatory military duty. Hence, they can’t choose the sector they work in between 
military and civilian sectors. They just choose to be the volunteers or draftees to serve in the 
Army. Consequently, it is reasonable to apply the pay of Type 1, 1,200K won, as the 
alternative pay standard to estimate cost of a voluntary system.  
 
4.2.5. The Cost Calculation    
I will focus on how much cost will be incurred depending on the each force strengths when I 
apply the annually reduced force strengths by Military Reform 2020 to the demand for the 
military manpower as of 2006. I will use each force strengths of the Army as the demand for 
the military manpower and the cumulative distribution of the draft-eligible men by each pay 
level as the supply for the military manpower. 
 
The cost estimation of a voluntary system can be divided into economic cost and financial 
cost likewise the draft system. The economic cost is the cumulative cost which is calculated 
by multiplying the number of draft-eligible men of each pay level by the corresponding pay 
level. On the other hand, the financial cost can be calculated by multiplying the cumulative 
number of draft-eligible men by the last pay of cumulative draft-eligible men.  
 
As mentioned above, the cost estimation of a voluntary system can be differed depending on 
the service period even with the same force strengths. For example, if the Army needs the 
force strengths of 240,000 men, annual recruits to be supplied are 120,000 men if the service 
period is 24 months, but annual recruits to supply are 80,000 men if it is 36 months. Thus, the 
total cost is changed by cumulative distribution of the draft-eligible men by pay level because 
the draft-eligible men of high pay level are not needed as long as the service period increases. 
So, the service period is a very important variable in estimating the cost. 
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In this paper, I will estimate the cost of a voluntary system with two cases. Case 1 is that the 
service period is 24 months, case 2 is 36 months. These standards of service period are useful 
because 24 months is the present service period of the draft system, and 36 months is the 
service period of PDS. But, if the Military Defense implements a voluntary system, it seems 
that at least 3 years of service period will be set forth, because 2 years of service period is too 
short for them to show their ability. In addition, I will estimate the cost of a voluntary system 
and analyze the result by applying the alternative pay of the PDS 
 
Case 1) The Criterion of 24 Month Military Service   
With the criterion of 24 month military service, if the force strengths of the Army are 450K, 
400K, 310K, and 240K, annual recruits will be the half of those force strengths: 225K, 200K, 
155K, and 120K. If we apply those annual recruits to supply curve, available number of 
military manpower by each pay level are as follows. 
 
Table 8: The Annual Supply of Recruits by Each Pay Level (24 Months) 
Force strengths 450,000 400,000 310,000 240,000 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
 
  Pay 
9,600 20,398 20,398 20,398 20,398 
10,800 17,481 17,481 17,481 17,481 
12,000 20,926 20,926 20,926 20,926 
13,200 28,336 28,336 28,336 28,336 
14,400 30,523 30,523 30,523 30,523 
15,600 32,955 32,955 32,955 2,334 
16,800 27,045 27,045 4,379  
18,000 24,269 1,937 -  
19,200 22,114 - -  
20,400 948 - - - 
Annual recruits 225,000 200,000 155,000 120,000 
 
In Table 8, with the criterion of 24 month military service, in case of annual recruits of 
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255,000, the Army needs draft-eligible men whose annual pay level is 20,400K won, and in 
case of annual recruits of 120,000 the Army needs draft-eligible men whose annual pay level 
is 15,600K won. That is, the number of draft-eligible men by each pay level is differed 
according to the recruit requirements. 
  
On the basis of Table 8, the demand for the annual recruits can be displayed in supply curve 
like Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: The Demand for Annual Recruit in Supply Curve (24 Months) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the pay level and the number of the military manpower by each pay level 
when the number of annual recruits are 225K, 200K, 155K, and 120K.  
 
Consequently, depending on each the force strengths, if we multiply annual recruits by the 
corresponding annual pay we can estimate the annual economic cost of the voluntary system. 
 
 
Annual 
Pay 
N  
20,400Kwon, 
225,000 
18,000Kwon, 
200,000 
15,600Kwon. 
120,000 
16,800won, 
155,000 
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Table 9: The Economic Cost (24 Months) 
Force strengths  Total cost15 Annual recruits Annual cost16 
450,000    6,597,222,864,000  225,000 3,298,611,432,000 
400,000    5,639,573,376,000  200,000 2,819,786,688,000 
310,000    4,073,981,568,000  155,000 2,036,990,784,000 
240,000    2,971,466,664,000  120,000 1,485,733,332,000 
 
Table 9 shows the total economic cost with the each force strengths in shifting to a voluntary 
system. If the Army moves to a voluntary system with the force strengths of 450,000 men, 
like the current state, the expected costs are roughly 6,500 billion won, on the other hand, if 
the Army reduces the force strengths of 240,000 men, the expected cost is 2,900 billion won.    
 
We estimated the economic cost of draft system in earlier chapter 3, the cost amounted to the 
minimum 6,062 billion won and the maximum 8,132 billion won, thus the average cost was 
7,090 billion won. On the other hand, the expected economic cost of the voluntary system is 
6,500 billion won in keeping the same force strengths of 450 thousand. The economic cost of 
the voluntary system is smaller than the draft system as much as roughly 590 billion won, this 
difference is induced by the supply curve. That is because we use the pay level by educational 
attainment as individual the opportunity cost when we estimate the economic cost of draft 
system.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
15 Total cost = annual cost * 2  
16 See appendix 2  
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On the other hand, the financial (budgetary) cost is as follows, Table 10. 
 
Table 10: The Financial Cost (24 Months) 
Force strengths  Total cost
17
 Annual recruits Annual cost
18
 
450,000 9,180,031,416,000 225,000 4,590,015,708,000 
400,000 7,200,008,640,000 200,000 3,600,004,320,000 
310,000 5,208,015,456,000 155,000 2,604,007,728,000 
240,000 3,744,009,048,000 120,000 1,872,004,524,000 
 
When the Army recruits men, they must pay the same amount to the all recruits even if their 
civilian pay level is unequal to each other. So, depending on the each force strengths, the 
annual pay level the Army should be 20,400K, 18,000K, 16,800K, and 15,600K won, which 
are the last pay levels of the each force strengths. As a result, the expected financial cost is 
9,100 billion won with the force strengths of 450,000 men, and 3,700 billion won with the 
force strengths of 240,000 men as shown in Table 10. The financial cost is higher than the 
economic cost of the same force strengths. But, the difference between economic cost and 
financial cost is the supplier surplus from a standpoint of the society, thus real cost of the 
voluntary system is the economic cost.  
 
Case 2) The Criterion of 36 Month Military service   
The method of estimating the cost of voluntary system with the criterion of 36 month military 
service is not different from the method with the criterion of 24 month military service. There 
is a difference only in the numbers applied by each pay level because the number of annual 
recruits needs to be decreased. So, the number of annual recruits requirements is 150K with 
the force strengths of 450K, 133K with the force strengths of 400K, 103K with force 
                                            
17 Total cost = annual cost * 2  
18 See appendix 3  
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strengths 310K, and 80K with the force strengths of 240K.   
 
Table 11: The Annual Supply of Recruits by Each Pay Level (36 Months) 
Force strengths 450,000 400,000 310,000 240,000 
Annual  
pay 
9,600  20,398 20,398 20,398 20,398 
10,800  17,482 17,482 17,482 17,482 
12,000  20,926 20,926 20,926 20,926 
13,200  28,337 28,337 28,337 21,194 
14,400  30,524 30,524 15,857 - 
15,600  32,334 5,334 - - 
Annual recruits 225,000 200,000 155,000 120,000 
 
Table 11 shows the supply
19
of draft eligible men by each annual pay level depending on the 
annual number of recruits with the criterion of 36 month service period. As compared with 
the criterion of 24 months, we can know that the number of recruits with a relatively high 
annual pay level goes down. That is because that the annual number of recruits needed 
decreases with the criterion of 36. Especially, considering that there are many men with 
university degree in the of high pay level group, voluntary system with the criterion of 36 
month has a merit that it doesn’t need to enlist the high-quality human resource in the Army.       
  
Now, the total economic cost is described as below in Table 12. It is calculated by 
multiplying the annual numbers of recruit of each pay level by each corresponding annual 
pay level on supply curve. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
19 We assume that annual distribution of draft-eligible men by each pay level is same 
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Table 12: The Economic Cost (36 Months) 
Force strengths  Total cost20 Annual recruits Annual cost21 
450,000 5,861,199,996,000  150,000  1,953,733,332,000  
400,000 4,597,599,996,000  123,000  1,532,533,332,000  
310,000 3,714,373,836,000  103,000  1,238,124,612,000  
240,000 2,746,492,200,000  80,000 915,497,400,000 
 
In Table 12, if the Army keeps the force strengths of 450,000 men with the criterion of 36 
month military service, the expected total economic cost is roughly 5,860 billion won, and 
with the force strengths of 240,000 men the expected cost is 2,740 billion won.   
 
On the other hand, the financial cost with the criterion of 36 month military service can be 
estimated likewise the criterion of 24 months 
 
Table 13: The Financial Cost (36 months) 
Force strengths  Total cost
22
 Annual recruits Annual cost
23
 
450,000    7,020,013,572,000  150,000      2,340,004,524,000  
400,000    5,756,413,572,000  123,000      1,918,804,524,000  
310,000    4,449,588,768,000  103,000      1,483,196,256,000  
240,000    3,167,993,268,000   80,000 1,055,997,756,000 
 
In table 13, the total final cost is estimated at roughly 7,020 billion won with the force 
strengths of 450,000 men, and roughly 3,100 billion won with the force strengths of 240,000 
men.     
 
                                            
20 Total cost = annual cost * 3   
21 See appendix 4  
22 Total cost = annual cost * 3  
23 See appendix   
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Case 3) the Criterion of Pay of the Paid-Draft System 
The cost estimation with the criterion of 24 and 36 month military service is changed by the 
supply numbers of each pay level according to each force strengths However, if we estimate 
the cost with the criterion of pay of PDS, it is changed only by the size of the force strengths 
irrespective of service period and the numbers of draft-eligible men by each pay level. 
 
Before estimating the cost with criterion of pay of PDS, we need one assumption. That is the 
number of men with the higher pay level than a monthly pay of 1,200K won who can enlist in 
the Army.
24
 
  
Based on the above mentioned assumption, the estimated cost with the criterion of pay PDS 
is as follows, Table 14. At this point, the economic cost and financial cost of PDS are the 
same amounts because there is only one criterion of pay level, monthly 1,200K won. 
 
Table 14: Total Cost with Criterion of Pay of PDS 
Force 
Strengths 
 
Total cost 
(billion 
won)25 
Annual pay 
(thousand 
won) 
Annual recruit 
(thousand) 
Annual cost 
(billion won) 
24 
Month 
36 
Month 
24 
Month 
36 
Month 
450,000 6,480 14,400  225 150  3,240 2,160   
400,000 5,776 14,400  200 123  2,888 1,771 
310,000 4,464 14,400  155 103  2,232 1,483 
240,000 3,456 14,400  120 80  1,728 1,152  
 
By Table 14, the expected total cost is roughly 6,400 billion won with the force strengths of 
450,000 men and roughly 3,400 billion won with the force strengths of 240,000 men. 
  
 
                                            
24 It is possible for them to enlist in the Army with their willingness and unemployment. The Military 
Manpower Administration don’t open the data associated with competition rate, but the person concerned says 
that the Military Manpower Administration attains the objective strengths planned enough by now. 
25 Total cost = the force strengths*annual pay   
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4.3. The Analysis  
So far, we have estimated the cost of the voluntary system by applying the criterion of service 
period and the criterion of pay of PDS depending on the respective force strengths. Firstly, 
let’s examine how the voluntary system minimizes the social cost as compared with the draft 
system. Table 15 shows the status of surplus labor of the Military Defense with a voluntary 
system.  
 
Table 15: The Status of Surplus Labor 
Force Strengths 
(The Military 
Defense) 
Annual Recruits 
Available 
Labor 
Surplus Labor 
24 
Months 
36 
Months 
24 
 Months 
36  
Months 
510,000 255,000 170,000 300,000 45,000 130,000 
460,000 230,000 153,000 300,000 70,000 147,000 
370,000 185,000 123,000 300,000 115,000 177,000 
300,000 150,000 100,000 300,000 150,000 200,000 
  
In South Korea’s case, the allocative cost is not induced and only deadweight loss is induced 
because South Korea has the all-draft system. In Table 15, under the all-draft system, surplus 
labor should serve in reservist duty, not active duty. That means a misallocation of labor 
resource because men on reservist duty are not actually necessary in this peace time but they 
must serve in other sector for the equity of military duty under the all-draft system. So, 
deadweight loss is produced by misallocation of labor resource in the light of the society. 
However, under a voluntary system the surplus labor doesn’t need to enlist in the military. So, 
the surplus labor remains in civil sector in order of the biggest civilian labor productivity. 
That means a voluntary system minimizes the deadweight loss by making surplus labor 
maximize their civilian labor productivity in civilian sector. Especially, the deadweight loss 
will decrease as the service period decrease more and more. Therefore, there is no room for 
argument that the voluntary system is better than the draft system with respect to economic 
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standpoint. 
 
Secondly, the distribution of draft-eligible men by pay level and the service period are very 
important factors to estimate the economic cost and financial cost of the voluntary system. In 
general, the cost decreases when the force strengths reduce and the service period decreases.  
 
Table 16: Comparison between the Economic and the Financial Cost 
 
Force 
Strengths 
24 Months  36 Months Pay of PDS 
Economic cost 
(billion) 
Financial cost 
(billion) 
Economic cost 
(billion) 
Financial cost 
(billion) 
Economic & 
Financial cost 
(billion) 
450,000 6,597.2 9,180.0 5,861.1 7,020.0 6,480.0 
400,000 5,639.5 7,200.0 4,597.5 5,756.4 5,776.0 
310,000 4,073.9 5,208.0 3,714.3 4,449.5 4,464.0 
240,000 2,971.4 3,744.0 2,746.4 3,167.9 3,456.0 
 
Table 16 shows the comparison between the economic cost and financial cost of voluntary 
system according to the each criterion. At first, if we compare the economic and financial 
cost of the criterion of 24 months with the economic and financial cost of the criterion of 36 
months, we can find that the cost of the 36 months criterion is smaller than the cost of 24 
months criterion with the same force strengths. That is because the number of draft-eligible 
men with relatively high pay level are not necessary as the annual recruit requirements reduce. 
Also, we can find that the difference between the financial cost of 24 months criterion and 36 
months criterion is 2,100 billion with the force strengths of 450,000 men, while the difference 
with the force strengths of 240,000 men is 600 billion. This implies that it is impossible to 
attract large number of recruits without a big pay increase. That is, the slope of supply curve 
is gentle in the low pay level section, but is steep in the relatively high pay level section. One 
of the reasons we can presume is the characteristics of supply curve in South Korea. In 
supply of the draft-eligible men, the 25 percentage of men is graduates with high school 
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degree. On the other hand, the roughly 75 percentage of men are graduates with junior 
college and university degree. We got the supply curve from the cumulative numbers by each 
civilian pay level, not cumulative numbers by educational degrees. However, if we consider 
that there are many university graduates in high pay level, we can conjecture that it is difficult 
for the Army to secure the forces objectives without a big pay increase as the forces 
objectives increase. 
  
Third, the cost of the voluntary system with criterion of the pay of PDS is the cheapest 
regarding over the force strengths of 400,000 men, but it is more costly regarding under the 
force strengths of 400,000 men. This is natural because the Army pays 1,200K won monthly 
to the men who have less than 1,200K won monthly. We can guess the reason why the Army 
pays to Paid-soldiers more money currently? Usually the pay level of PDS is higher than pay 
level of the normal combatant. That is why the Paid-soldiers are more skillful than normal 
combatants. Also, the estimated cost of the voluntary system with the pay of PDS is very 
useful in that the pay of PDS is applicable to the voluntary system right now depending on 
the success of PDS. The Army has a plan to increase the paid-soldier as much as 40,000 by 
2020. So, we need to watch that plan with concern. That is, if the plan is not successful we 
can conjecture that the monthly pay to be increased is more 1,200K won monthly in regard to 
a voluntary system. 
 
5. The prospects of Transition into a Voluntary system   
So far, we examined how much economic and financial cost will be expensed with a 
voluntary system according to the each force strengths. Then, at present, is the transition into 
a voluntary system feasible? The reasons the government and the Ministry of National 
Defense provide against the implementation of the voluntary system are financial problems. 
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This is because, the budget required for the transition into the voluntary system is far greater 
than the government budget allocated for the military and also the Ministry of National 
Defense budget. Therefore, let us examine if financial issues are really the main reasons 
behind the reluctance to implement the voluntary system.  
 
Table 17: The Status of Budget in 2006 
 
 Personnel 
cost (trillion) 
The Army  
(trillion) 
The Defense 
(trillion) 
The government 
(trillion) 
Budget in 2006
26
 56,902 100,039 225,129 1,448,000 
Average increase rate
a 6.6% 8.8% 9.4% 8.0% 
a. Average increase rate from ’02 to ’05, “Annual Report on the Army 2007.” 
 
In 2006, the government budget was 147 trillion won, the national defense budget was 22.5 
trillion, and the Army budget was 10 trillion won. The personnel cost in the Army budget 
(including meals, clothes; 1.4 trillion won) was 5.7 trillion won. Now, if the Army moves to a 
voluntary system with the force strengths of 400,000men, even the minimum financial cost of 
6.4 trillion, which is the cost applied to the criterion of pay of PDS, will be a big burden to 
Military Defense and the Army when the cost is compared with the defense budget of 2006 
and personnel cost of the Army of that same year. The financial cost of 6.4 trillion is 28 
percent of the defense budget, and exceeds the personnel cost of the Army budget. Also, the 
financial cost of 6.4 trillion is only for soldiers, not including officers. So, personnel cost 
including officers amounts to 12.1 trillion won, which will exceed the Army budget as well. 
Consequently, it seems impossible to move to a voluntary system at this point in time. 
  
However, the budget issue is altogether a different problem from the national point of view. 
That is because a budget occupies only a small portion of national productivity. As mentioned 
                                            
26 See appendix 6 
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before, the greatest issue with the draft system is the deadweight loss. Since the demand 
curve for the military manpower is not known, it is not feasible to estimate the size of the 
deadweight loss, however, as can be seen from the status of surplus labor in Table 15, the size 
of the deadweight loss resulted by the draft system would be very significant.  
 
Therefore, since it is quite possible to maximize the national productivity by transitioning 
into the voluntary system, getting rid of the deadweight loss, the financial reasons cited by 
the government and the Ministry of National Defense for not transitioning into the voluntary 
system are wrong from an economic point of view. For example, the 7.1 trillion won of 
financial cost may occupy a large portion of the defense budget, but from a national point of 
view, the national productivity lost due to the draft system is much more important. Therefore, 
the argument that supports the draft system due to financial reasons is not proper. 
 
If there is any problem at all associated with the transition into the voluntary system, it might 
be with the public opinion. If people feel that threats to national security have increased due 
to the transition into the voluntary system, no matter how much the national productivity is 
increased, the implementation of the voluntary system will not be feasible. According to the 
national security consensus conducted by the Research Institute on National Security Affairs 
of the Korea National Defense University in 2006, only 29.5% of the population is in favor of 
the implementation of the voluntary system. This wide-spread public opinion shows that it is 
too early for the implementation of the voluntary system. It has been stated before that the 
military service system is determined by many variables other than the economic variable, 
public opinion is one of those important variables.  
 
Also, the transition into the voluntary system is a political issue and it clearly implies a tax 
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increase for the people. It is only natural that the taxpayer does not welcome a voluntary 
system in which they have to pay more taxes than what they are paying now. Of course, from 
a standpoint of men having military duty, the transition to a voluntary system might be good 
to them but from a standpoint of men discharged military duty, voluntary system impose 
another tax on them. The problem is that the number of men discharged from military duty is 
significantly more than the number of draftable men. Because of this, the politicians, who 
need significant support from the population, will be quite reluctant to adopt the voluntary 
system.  
 
In South Korea, it is quite likely that the implementation of the voluntary system will not be 
realized for reasons other than those cited above. However, considering the fact that the 
voluntary system maximizes the national productivity, it is an issue that needs to be seriously 
reviewed by the concerned departments of the government, Ministry of National Defense etc.  
  
6. Summary and Conclusion  
So far, many preceding studies have suggested that the voluntary system is better than the 
draft system from the standpoint of efficiency because the draft system induces the additional 
allocative cost. That is, in the process of compulsory draft, civilian labor productivity is not 
maximized due to the random selections without considering the individual opportunity cost. 
However, that is suitable for the U.S. with the selective draft system, while that is not 
applicable to South Korea with the all-draft system. Since all qualified men should enlist in 
the military under the all-draft system, the allocative cost by random selections are not 
produced. Thus, I stated about the deadweight loss as basic social cost. The deadweight loss 
is social cost produced by misallocation of labor resource between military sector and civilian 
sector. In other words, that is the fundamental problem on how the labor resources are 
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allocated to the military sector and civilian sector to maximize the civilian output. In brief, 
the total social cost of the draft system will be the sum of the allocative cost and deadweight 
loss. Many preceding studies have focused on the allocative cost, but we need to know about 
deadweight loss regarding to the draft system. Especially, since South Korea has all-draft 
system, he should care about this deadweight loss.   
 
Also, the draft system produces the equity of tax burden by imposing the implicit income tax 
(economic cost minus financial cost) on the draftees. The civilians can use the defense service 
with small explicit tax under the draft system, but that is just unreasonable tax burden to the 
draftees. So, the draft system can’t be free from the problem of equity of tax burden, 
especially as the society develops economically. Actually, if we estimate the cost of the draft 
system in South Korea, the financial cost is roughly 1,235 billion won, and the economic cost 
is minimum 6,062 billion won and maximum 8,132 billion won. So, the draft system spends 
maximum 6,897 billion won and minimum 4,827 billion won annually as the invisible cost to 
keep the draft system. In other words, the draftees have paid this cost as the implicit tax.   
 
We estimated how much cost would be spent if the draft system moves to a voluntary system. 
We assumed that the demand for military manpower is given by the Military Reform 2020, 
and we use the cumulative numbers (distribution) of draft-eligible men by each pay level as 
the supply curve. We estimated the cost of a voluntary system depending on service period. 
One is the criterion of 24 month military service and the other is the criterion of 36 month 
military service. In addition, we estimated the cost with the criterion of pay of PDS. As a 
result, if the Army keeps the force strengths of 450,000 men as of 2006 under the voluntary 
system, roughly 9,700 billion is estimated with 24 months criterion and 7,000 billion is 
estimated with 36 months criterion as financial costs, respectively. Also, we estimate the cost 
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of a voluntary system with the criterion of pay of PDS for the each force strengths. That is 
meaningful in that the pay of PDS is an applicable pay level to voluntary system immediately.   
 
If we compare these financial costs with the present Army budget of 5,600 billion won, it 
exceeds the Army budget. So, it seems impossible to move to a voluntary system at this point 
in time. However, the budget issue is a totally different one altogether from the national point 
of view. Budget is only a small portion of the national GDP. Namely, for the country, the 
deadweight loss incurred due to the draft system may be much more in terms of national 
productivity. Therefore, if the transition into a voluntary system can reduce the deadweight 
loss resulted due to the draft system, it is better to adopt the voluntary system right away. 
  
Hence, in regards to the transition into the voluntary system, budget is not a major issue. On 
the other hand, factors such as public opinion about the voluntary system and political issues 
other than economic may hamper the transition into the voluntary system. This truly points 
out the fact that the transition into a voluntary system may not be well received by the 
population from a political point of view. However, considering the fact that the voluntary 
system is better than the draft system in terms of economy, the adoption of the voluntary 
system deserves a serious review by all concerned authorities.  
 
So far, we examined the theoretical background of draft system to estimate the cost of the 
draft system, and we actually estimated the economic cost and financial cost of the draft in 
South Korea. Also, we examined the prospect of the transition to a voluntary system by 
estimating the economic and financial cost with the each force strengths. 
  
However, there were many restrictions for study as well. Above cost estimation was possible 
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under the assumption that the demand for the military manpower was given by the Army. 
Actually, it is necessary to measure the social cost to estimate the cost of the draft system. To 
do so, the demand curve for military manpower is essential but there are no studies relevant 
to the demand curve in South Korea. That is because the demand for military manpower must 
reflect such extra-economic variables as national security risk, historical experience, national 
sentiment, and so forth. 
 
On supply side, we use the cumulative distribution of the draftable men born in specific year 
according to the pay level under the assumption that the distribution of draftable men follows 
the distribution of men aged 19 to 24 by civilian pay level. However, there may be some 
problems because in the present South Korea most of the above mentioned men aged 19 to 24 
are students and servicemen in the military, so there may be some errors in the sample. In 
addition to that, the supply curve can be affected by manifold variables such as 
unemployment, the degree of individual aversion to the military, and so forth. Therefore, 
further studies about the supply and demand for military manpower are necessary to move to 
a voluntary system in South Korea. 
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[Appendix 1] Pay level by Education, Age, and workers by size 
 
Size  Education Age 2005 
Mean average 
(age) 
Years of continuous 
employment (year) 
Monthly payment 
(won) 
Regular payment 
(won) 
Overtime payment 
(won) 
Group 1 (5 ~ 9 
persons) 
High school 
~ 19 years old 18.3 0.6 859,012 794,224 64,788 
20 ~ 24 22.8 0.9 1,134,795 1,086,160 48,635 
College and 
university over 
20 ~ 24 23.5 1 1,123,877 1,072,139 51,738 
Group 2 (10 ~ 29 
persons) 
High school 
~ 19 years old 18.7 0.7 954,659 871,337 83,322 
20 ~ 24 22.6 1.2 1,159,026 1,008,186 150,840 
College and 
university over 
~ 19 years old - - - - - 
20 ~ 24 22.9 0.9 1,331,224 1,261,994 69,230 
Group 3 (30 ~ 99 
persons) 
High school 
~ 19 years old 18.5 0.7 1,026,164 785,648 240,516 
20 ~ 24 22.5 1.4 1,160,906 907,833 253,073 
Junior college 
~ 19 years old 18.9 0.9 938,496 843,636 94,860 
20 ~ 24 23.1 0.9 1,197,437 1,054,128 143,310 
College and 
university over 
~ 19 years old 19 0.5 818,778 803,000 15,778 
20 ~ 24 23.1 0.9 1,264,628 1,181,358 83,270 
25 ~ 29 27.5 1.6 1,652,969 1,573,354 79,615 
Group 4 (100 ~ 299 
persons) 
High school 
~ 19 years old 18.5 0.8 1,131,301 848,494 282,807 
20 ~ 24 22.6 1.4 1,243,622 942,319 301,304 
Junior college 
~ 19 years old 18.7 0.7 896,847 810,111 86,736 
20 ~ 24 23.2 1 1,313,389 1,104,602 208,787 
College and 
university over 
~ 19 years old 19 0.8 1,222,889 1,086,296 136,593 
20 ~ 24 22.9 1.1 1,348,382 1,246,162 102,220 
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[Appendix 1]- (continued) 
 
Size  Education Age 2005 
Mean average 
(age) 
Years of continuous 
employment (year) 
Monthly payment 
(won) 
Regular payment 
(won) 
Overtime payment 
(won) 
Group 5 (300 ~ 499 
persons) 
High school ~ 19 years old 18.2 0.8 1,299,920 770,070 529,850 
20 ~ 24 22.9 1.3 1,246,220 875,435 370,785 
Junior college ~ 19 years old 18.9 0.4 959,900 639,100 320,800 
 
Group 6 (500 
persons over) 
 
College and 
university over 
20 ~ 24 23.1 0.9 1,272,629 978,347 294,281 
~ 19 years old 19 0.6 601,273 601,273 0 
20 ~ 24 23.1 1.2 1,381,262 1,215,671 165,592 
High school ~ 19 years old 18.5 0.9 1,232,292 976,320 255,972 
20 ~ 24 22.9 2 1,312,131 1,002,344 309,788 
 Junior college ~ 19 years old 18.6 0.7 1,149,238 864,119 285,119 
20 ~ 24 23.4 1 1,280,246 1,090,262 189,984 
College and 
university over 
~ 19 years old 19 0.2 903,828 616,586 287,241 
20 ~ 24 23.4 0.9 1,560,316 1,429,811 130,505 
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[Appendix 2] The Economic Cost with the Criterion 24 Month military service   
 
Annual payment Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost 
9,600,000 20,398 195,822,144,000 20,398 195,822,144,000 20,398 195,822,144,000 20398 195,822,144,000 
10,800,000 17,482 188,800,416,000 17,482 188,800,416,000 17,482 188,800,416,000 17482 188,800,416,000 
12,000,000 20,926 251,114,040,000 20,926 251,114,040,000 20,926 251,114,040,000 20926 251,114,040,000 
13,200,000 28,337 374,047,212,000 28,337 374,047,212,000 28,337 374,047,212,000 28337 374,047,212,000 
14,400,000 30,524 439,539,120,000 30,524 439,539,120,000 30,524 439,539,120,000 30524 439,539,120,000 
15,600,000 32,955 514,100,652,000 32,955 514,100,652,000 32,955 514,100,652,000 2334 36,410,400,000 
16,800,000 27,046 454,369,104,000 27,046 454,369,104,000 4,379 73,567,200,000 - - 
18,000,000 24,270 436,857,480,000 22,333 401,994,000,000 - - - - 
19,200,000 22,115 424,601,664,000 - - - - - - 
20,400,000 948 19,339,200,000 - - - - - - 
Annual recruits 225,000 3,298,591,032,000 200,000 2,819,786,688,000 155,000 2,036,990,784,000 120,000 1,485,733,332,000 
Force Strength 450,000 6,597,182,064,000 400,000 5,639,573,376,000 310,000 4,073,981,568,000 240,000 2,971,466,664,000 
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[Appendix 3] The Financial Cost with the Criterion 24 Month military service   
Annual payment Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost 
9,600,000 20,398 416,122,056,000 20,398 367,166,520,000 20,398 342,688,752,000 20,398 318,210,984,000 
10,800,000 17,482 356,623,008,000 17,482 314,667,360,000 17,482 293,689,536,000 17,482 272,711,712,000 
12,000,000 20,926 426,893,868,000 20,926 376,671,060,000 20,926 351,559,656,000 20,926 326,448,252,000 
13,200,000 28,337 578,072,964,000 28,337 510,064,380,000 28,337 476,060,088,000 28,337 442,055,796,000 
14,400,000 30,524 622,680,420,000 30,524 549,423,900,000 30,524 512,795,640,000 30,524 476,167,380,000 
15,600,000 32,955 672,285,468,000 32,955 593,193,060,000 32,955 553,646,856,000 2,334 36,410,400,000 
16,800,000 27,046 551,733,912,000 27,046 486,824,040,000 4,379 73,567,200,000 - - 
18,000,000 24,270 495,105,144,000 22,333 401,994,000,000 - - - - 
19,200,000 22,115 451,139,268,000 - - - - - - 
20,400,000 949 19,359,600,000 - - - - - - 
Annual recruits 225,000 4,590,015,708,000 200,000 3,600,004,320,000 155,000 2,604,007,728,000 120000 1,872,004,524,000 
Force Strength 450,000 9,180,031,416,000 400,000 7,200,008,640,000 310,000 5,208,015,456,000 240000 3,744,009,048,000 
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[Appendix 4] The Economic Cost with the Criterion 36 Month military service   
 
Annual payment Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost 
9,600,000 20,398 195,822,144,000 20,398 195,822,144,000 20,398 195,822,144,000 20,398 195,822,144,000 
10,800,000 17,482 188,800,416,000 17,482 188,800,416,000 17,482 188,800,416,000 17,482 188,800,416,000 
12,000,000 20,926 251,114,040,000 20,926 251,114,040,000 20,926 251,114,040,000 20,926 251,114,040,000 
13,200,000 28,337 374,047,212,000 28,337 374,047,212,000 28,337 374,047,212,000 21,194 279,760,800,000 
14,400,000 30,524 439,539,120,000 30,524 439,539,120,000 15,857 228,340,800,000 - - 
15,600,000 32,334 504,410,400,000 5,334 83,210,400,000 - - - - 
Annual recruits 150,000 1,953,733,332,000 123,000 1,532,533,332,000 103,000 1,238,124,612,000 80,000 915,497,400,000 
Force Strength 450,000 5,861,199,996,000 400,000 4,597,599,996,000 310,000 3,714,373,836,000 240,000 2,746,492,200,000 
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[Appendix 5] The Financial Cost with the Criterion 36 Month military service   
 
Annual payment Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost Number Cost 
9,600,000 20,398 318,210,984,000 20,398 318,210,984,000 20,398 293,733,216,000 20,398 269,255,448,000 
10,800,000 17,482 272,711,712,000 17,482 272,711,712,000 17,482 251,733,888,000 17,482 230,756,064,000 
12,000,000 20,926 326,448,252,000 20,926 326,448,252,000 20,926 301,336,848,000 20,926 276,225,444,000 
13,200,000 28,337 442,055,796,000 28,337 442,055,796,000 28,337 408,051,504,000 21,194 279,760,800,000 
14,400,000 30,524 476,167,380,000 30,524 476,167,380,000 15,857 228,340,800,000 - - 
15,600,000 32,334 504,410,400,000 5,334 83,210,400,000 - - - - 
Annual recruits 150,000 2,340,004,524,000 123,000 1,918,804,524,000 103,000 1,483,196,256,000 80,000 1,055,997,756,000 
Force Strength 450,000 7,020,013,572,000 400,000 5,756,413,572,000 310,000 4,449,588,768,000 240,000 3,167,993,268,000 
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[Appendix 6] The Status of Budget in 2006  
Unit: Billion 
Year 02 03 04 05 06 Average 
Government Budget 109,630.0 111,418.0 118,300.0 134,370.0 144,700.0 127,303.6 
%(Increase rate compared with previous year)  1.6 6.2 13.6 7.8 8 
Defense Budget 16,364.0 17,514.8 18,941.2 20,822.6 22,512.9 19,231.1 
%(Increase rate compared with previous year)  7 8.1 9.9 8.1 9.4 
Army Budget 7,397.0 7,982.6 8,620.4 9,170.2 10,003.9 8,634.8 
%(Increase rate compared with previous year)  7.9 8 6.4 9.1 8.8 
  Defense Capacity Improvement Cost 1,866.0 1,950.5 2,041.0 2,253.5 1,817.0 1,985.6 
  %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  4.5 4.6 10.4 -19.4 -0.7 
  Ordinary Operating Cost 5,531.0 6,032.1 6,579.4 6,916.7 8,186.9 6,649.2 
  %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  9.1 9.1 5.1 18.4 12 
    Personnel Cost 4,499.9 4,829.1 5,113.6 5,299.7 5,690.2 5,086.5 
    %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  7.3 5.9 3.6 7.4 6.6 
    Unit Activity 245.6 252.3 252.5 26.2 227.3 247.9 
    %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  2.7 0.1 3.8 -13.2 -1.9 
    Education and Training 129.3 137.6 139.2 130.4 132.8 133.9 
    %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  6.4 1.2 -6.3 1.8 0.7 
    Equipment Management 193.5 224.2 228.9 237.9 1,051.1 387.1 
    %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  15.9 2.1 3.9 341.8 110.8 
    Material Procurement 94.6 96.1 106.6 106.6 62.3 93.2 
    %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  1.6 10.9 0 -41.6 -8.5 
    Facility Construction 293.7 412.5 656.7 790.2 939.0 618.4 
    %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  40.5 59.2 20.3 18.8 54.9 
    Reserve Forces 74.4 80.3 81.9 89.9 84.1 82.1 
    %(Increase rate compared with previous year)  7.9 2 9.8 -6.5 3.3 
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